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Environmental Policy Since
Earth Day I: What Do We Know
About the Benefits and Costs?
A. Myrick Freeman, III
Data on costs and benefits of the major environmental laws passed during the 1970s are reviewed. The
winners in terms of benefit-cost analysis include: getting lead out of gasoline, controlling particulate
air pollution, reducing the concentration of lead in drinking water, and the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites with the lowest cost per cancer case avoided under Superfund. The losers include: mobile source
air pollution control, water pollution control, and many of the regulations and cleanup decisions taken
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the
Safe Drinking Water Act, and Superfund.
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Earth Day I (April 22, 1970) is an appropriate
starting point for an examination of the economic
benefits and costs that have been realized through
U.S. environmental policy. While there were federal
laws on the books dealing with air and water pollu-
tion prior to that date, those laws placed primary
responsibility for the implementation and enforce-
ment of pollution control requirements on the states.
By 1970, they had not accomplished very much.
The first Earth Day reflected a major increase in
public awareness of and concern about environ-
mental problems. It was followed in relatively quick
succession by: the passage of the Clean Air Act of
1970; the formation of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) in December 1970; and the
passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972, now known as the Clean Water Act. In
these two acts, much more stringent pollution con-
trol objectives were established, and responsibility
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for setting and enforcing pollution control require-
ments was shifted largely to the federal government.
1
The next 10 years saw the enactment of the Safe
Drinking Water Act (1974), the Toxic Substances
Control Act (1976), the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (1976), the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(known as Superfund) (1980), and major amend-
ments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (1972).
Broadly speaking, the goals of environmental
policy can be based either on a balancing of benefits
and costs (economic efficiency) or on some other
goal, such as safety, protection of human health,
protection of ecosystems, or the achievement of
technically feasible levels of emissions control.
With the first two major environmental laws of the
early 1970s—the Clean Air Act and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act—Congress explicitly
rejected the economic approach to goal setting.
With regard to clean air, it emphasized protecting
human health. With regard to clean water, it
emphasized achieving fishable and swimmable
water quality.
1 For discussion of the context in which the Clean Air Act of 1970 and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 were passed, and the
goals and aims of these acts, see Portney (2000) and Freeman (2000),
respectively.
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However, concern for economic efficiency has
not been entirely absent in Congressional environ-
mental policy. More recently, Congress has written
implicit or explicit economic efficiency criteria into
three major environmental laws: the Toxic Substan-
ces Control Act of 1976, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1976, and the
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996.
Moreover, as a result of a series of executive orders
by presidents of both parties stretching back to the
Nixon administration, there has been an expanding
set of requirements for federal agencies to perform
economic assessments of all major proposed regu-
lations, including an assessment of their benefits
and costs (Smith, 1984; Morgenstern, 1997; Hahn,
1996, 1998, 2000). These assessments are commonly
referred to as “regulatory impact assessments.”
In this paper, I review the available information
on trends in the major indicators of performance of
the clean air and water laws over the past three
decades and what can be said about the roles of
these laws in explaining these trends. My main
focus is on what these improvements are worth to
people (their benefits) and what they have cost. In
aggregate, federal environmental laws are imposing
significant costs on the American society. The most
recent comprehensive EPA survey of the annual
costs of compliance with existing environmental
laws, conducted in 1990, estimated costs in the year
1990 to be about $152 billion, rising to perhaps
$225 billion in 2000 (U.S. EPA, 1990).
2 (All dollar
values presented in this paper are expressed in 2000
prices.) Are the benefits of these far-reaching envi-
ronmental laws commensurate with these costs?
The Clean Air Act
The goals of the Clean Air Act of 1970 are ex-
pressed in two major provisions. For the six major
“conventional” air pollutants—sulfur dioxide, nitro-
gen oxides, particulate matter, carbon monoxide,
ozone, and lead—Congress specified that EPA
should establish the maximum allowable concen-
trations of these pollutants in the air. These air
quality standards are to be set so as to “protect
human health ... allowing an adequate margin of
safety....” This language and the absence of any
reference to cost have generally been interpreted as
meaning that the cost of attaining the standard was
not to be taken into account in setting the standard.
The second major provision regarding goals in
the original Clean Air Act was the establishment of
specific tailpipe emissions standards for new cars,
to be met originally by 1975 and 1976. These stand-
ards entailed reductions of 84S90% in emissions per
mile traveled from the then-current uncontrolled
levels. These reduction targets were based on a crude
calculation of what would be required to reduce the
concentrations of these pollutants to levels where no
adverse health effects were expected (Seskin, 1980;
Tietenberg, 2000, p. 427). In subsequent amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act, tailpipe emissions stand-
ards have been further tightened, but the revisions
have not been based on any explicit consideration
of human health or cost.
Emissions and Air Quality
To assess the effects of the Clean Air Act on
emissions and air pollution levels, it is not enough
to show downward trends in these measures. It is
necessary to compare what emissions and air qual-
ity would have been in the absence of the Act with
what has actually been observed. As part of a retro-
spective analysis of the benefits and costs of the
Clean Air Act, EPA developed a model of the U.S.
economy to generate estimates of emissions of five
major air pollutants, both with the Act and what they
would have been in the absence of the regulations
promulgated under the Act (U.S. EPA, 1997).
Figure 1 shows the actual estimated emissions of
total suspended particulate (TSP) matter for the
country as a whole from 1950 to 1990 (labeled
“Trends”), along with the predicted emissions under
the “Control” (the law passed) and “No-Control” (the
law didn’t pass) scenarios. As observed from figure
1, emissions actually declined from 1950 to 1970,
and the decline accelerated during the first decade
of the Clean Air Act. Also during the 20 years
covered by the Act, actual and predicted emissions
were approximately equal. Finally, figure 1 shows
an increasing trend in emissions was expected to
occur from 1970 to 1990 in the absence of the con-
trols imposed by the Act. The two principal sources
of the projected increases were electric utilities and
motor vehicles.
Figure 2 graphs similar estimates of actual,
control, and no-control emissions of nitrogen oxides
(NOx) from 1950 to 1990. Actual emissions were
2  Unfortunately, EPA has not updated its 1990 analysis, and I know of
no other recent, comprehensive, and credible estimate of total compliance
costs for more recent years. Moreover, some analysts have substantial
reservations about the methods used by EPA to project compliance costs
forward from 1990, and they suspect that the costs for 2000 were substan-
tially overestimated (Paul Portney, personal communication, July 26,
2001).Freeman Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policy   3
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997.
Figure 1. Comparison of control, no-control,
and trends TSP emission estimates, 1950S S S S
1990
increasing over the period 1950 to 1980, and approx-
imately constant from 1980 to 1990. EPA projected
that in the absence of the Act, the rising trend of
emissions would have continued throughout the
period.
EPA has generated similar figures for emissions
trends for sulfur dioxide, volatile organic com-
pounds (VOC), and carbon monoxide (U.S. EPA,
1997). In all cases, the analysis reveals the Act had
a significant effect in reducing emissions. The EPA
data suggest the observed decreases in the national
average concentrations of these pollutants can rea-
sonably be attributed to the Clear Air Act. For more
discussion of emissions and air quality, see Portney
(2000) or U.S. EPA (1998).
In a similar modeling exercise undertaken for the
prospective analysis of the benefits and costs of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, EPA projected
emissions of the major air pollutants both with and
without the amendments for the years 2000 and
2010 (U.S. EPA, 1999). These projections show
substantial decreases in the predicted emissions of
volatile organic chemicals, nitrogen oxides, and sul-
fur dioxide.
Benefits and Costs
At the time the original Clean Air Act was being
considered by Congress in the late 1960s, no com-
prehensive assessments existed of the likely benefits
and costs of the Act—or of any alternative changes
in air pollution policy. In the 10 years or so after its
enactment, a number of studies were conducted of
specific benefits from cleaner air, including health,
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997.
Figure 2. Comparison of control, no-control,
and trends NOx emission estimates, 1950S S S S
1990
reduced materials damage, public amenities, and
higher crop yields.
In 1982, I published a review and synthesis of the
available studies and compared my best estimate of
the aggregate benefits realized as of 1978 with the
costs as estimated by the Council on Environmental
Quality (Freeman, 1982).
3 My estimate of benefits
was based on the assumption that in the absence of
the Act, total emissions would have remained at the
1970 level. I considered costs and benefits separ-
ately for mobile sources—primarily motor vehicles,
and for stationary sources—primarily industrial and
power plants. I provided both best estimates and sub-
jective uncertainty bounds, which were substantial.
As table 1 reports, I found the control of station-
ary sources was yielding substantial net benefits,
but the emissions standards for automobiles were
not. Almost 80% of the benefits were in the form of
improvements to human health, and most of that
category was due to reductions in premature mor-
tality associated with airborne particulates. At that
time, there was a great deal of controversy about the
possible link between particulates and premature
mortality. Now the evidence for such a link is sub-
stantially stronger, although controversy continues.
In Section 812 of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, Congress expressed its concern over the
economic consequences of the original Clean Air
Act by directing EPA to undertake a “comprehen-
sive analysis of the impact of this Act on the public
health, economy, and the environment....” This
report is known as the “Retrospective Analysis.”
3  For further discussion of these estimates, see Portney (1990).4   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Benefits and Costs of Clean Air Act





Benefits   0.8 56.5 57.3
Costs 20.1 23.8 43.8
Source: Freeman, 1982.
Table 2. Benefits and Costs of Clean Air Act
for Selected Years (billions of 2000 $/year)
1975 1980 1990
Benefits
 a   468 1,225 1,644
Costs:
  Mobile Source
 b 7.2 7.7 8.8
  Stationary Source
 b 8.1 16.7 23.5
  Other
 c 2.7 2.9 2.0
  Total 18.0 27.4 34.3
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997.
Note: Column totals may not add due to rounding.
a From source table I-5.
b From source table A-9.
c From source table A-9; monitoring, enforcement, and R&D costs by
governments.
Congress also required that EPA publish an
update of the original analysis and projections of
future benefits and costs every two years there-
after. These reports are known as the “Prospec-
tive Analyses.” Finally, Congress directed EPA
to establish an independent panel of experts to
review the methodologies, data, and findings of
the Assessment.
4
EPA’s analysis of benefits consisted of four steps
(U.S. EPA, 1997): (a) modeling economic activity
and the resulting emissions in the U.S. over the
period 1970S1990 with the Act (roughly, what actu-
ally happened) and under the assumption of no
control requirements other than those already in
place in 1970 (a “with” versus “without” analysis);
(b) prediction of the concentrations of air pollutants
under the two scenarios over the 20-year interval;
(c) prediction of the differences in the physical
effects of air pollution between the two scenarios;
and (d) monetary valuation of the reductions in
these effects associated with the Act. These effects
included premature mortality, chronic bronchitis,
other respiratory health effects, reductions in IQ
associated with elevated blood lead levels in children,
reductions in visibility, and damages to materials and
crops.
From table 2, based on the EPA analysis, the
estimated benefits exceeded the costs by a ratio of
about 28:1, 45:1, and 48:1, respectively, in the three
years selected. EPA carried out Monte Carlo analy-
ses of benefits and reported sensitivity analyses of
various categories of benefits under alternative
assumptions. Even the 95% lower bound on benefits
was an order of magnitude greater than the esti-
mated costs. However, the EPA analysis understates
the true uncertainty. The analysis of uncertainty in
benefits considered only statistical uncertainties in
the estimation of impacts and valuations. It did not
include model uncertainties or uncertainties in esti-
mates of emissions and changes in air quality. Also,
there was no treatment of uncertainty in the cost
estimates.
How plausible are these EPA figures? The EPA’s
estimates of average annual benefits are an order of
magnitude higher than my estimates in 1982. Four
factors account for most of this difference: the
higher values used by EPA for the value of reducing
the risk of premature mortality and greater sensi-
tivity of mortality to particulate matter exposures
(both based on more recent evidence), the different
assumptions about air pollution levels in the absence
of the Act, and the inclusion of additional years
with improved air quality.
The whole stream of benefits estimated by EPA
from 1970 to 1990 comes to $30 trillion (brought
forward at 5% per year in 2000 dollars). Lutter and
Belzer (2000) contend this amount is implausibly
high, pointing out it is “roughly the aggregate net
worth of all U.S. households in 1990” (see also
Portney, 2000, p. 110). But that comparison is some-
what misleading because net worth is a financial
balance sheet concept related to the present value of
future financial flows, while the benefit figure is a
future value of a flow of nonmarket services. A
more accurate description would be to say that as
of 1970 (the starting point of the Retrospective
Analysis), the present value of the stream of future
benefits from the Clean Air Act from 1971 to 1990
was about 20% of the present value of the future
stream of personal income in the United States over
that time.
Many might feel this amount is still too high. But
I would argue it is not wildly implausible that people
would be willing to give up 20% of their income
to avoid the increase in air pollution emissions
4  In the interest of full disclosure, I served on this panel, which is known
as the Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis, from its
inception in 1992 until 2000.Freeman Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policy   5
projected by EPA for 1970 to 1990, and instead to
experience the falling emissions and improving air
quality associated with the Act.
The EPA report does not provide separate
estimates of the benefits of controlling mobile and
stationary sources or of the costs of eliminating lead
in gasoline so that program-specific benefits and
costs can be compared.
5 But some interesting lessons
can still be learned. First, 75% of the total benefits
claimed by EPA come from reducing premature
mortality associated with fine particles, and another
8% of the total benefits come from reduced inci-
dence of chronic bronchitis from the same cause.
Since fine particles come mostly from stationary
sources, the analysis concludes the benefits of
stationary source controls on the emissions of fine
particles and their precursors (oxides of sulfur and
nitrogen) very substantially outweigh the costs.
Second, the benefits of eliminating lead in gas-
oline are about 8% of the total, and they accrue
primarily after 1985. Even if all of the mobile source
control costs were attributed to removing lead, the
benefits of lead removal would substantially out-
weigh the costs, and probably no more than 10% of
the mobile source control costs reported here are
associated with the lead program (U.S. EPA, 1985).
Finally, even if all of the remaining categories of
benefits (primarily other respiratory health effects
and crop damages) were attributed to controlling
mobile source emissions other than lead, their costs
would substantially exceed benefits.
EPA has now published its first Prospective
Analysis which estimates the benefits and costs
associated with the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 (U.S. EPA, 1999). It also shows total benefits
well in excess of costs. However, the only explicit
comparison of benefits and costs for a specific
program is for Title VI, which limits emissions of
stratospheric ozone-depleting substances such as
chlorofluorocarbons. For this title, annual benefits
are estimated at $33 billion over the next 75 years
compared to annual costs of only $1.8 billion. Even
if one looks at only the lower end of the 95% con-
fidence interval for benefits, benefits for this title
would exceed costs by nearly a factor of four.
EPA’s estimate of the benefits of Title VI might
be biased upward for several reasons. Reducing
fatalities from melanoma (a form of skin cancer) is
a major component of the benefits of controlling
ozone-depleting substances, but there is substantial
uncertainty about the relationship between ultra-
violet radiation and melanoma (U.S. EPA, Science
Advisory Board, 1999). Also, the analysis assumed
no changes in behavior to reduce exposure to ultra-
violet radiation as a way of mitigating the effects of
stratospheric ozone depletion. And it assumes no
improvements in cure rates for melanoma due to
expanded early detection programs or improved
treatment. On the other hand, benefits are under-
stated to the extent there might be significant eco-
logical impacts due to ultraviolet radiation which
are difficult to predict and evaluate in economic
terms.
For the remaining parts of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, aggregate benefits exceed
costs by 4 to 1. But the 95% lower bound on bene-
fits is less than the estimated costs. Moreover, as in
the case of the Retrospective study, the true uncer-
tainties are understated.
Again, it is possible to get some sense of the
relative costs and benefits of the stationary source
and mobile source programs by digging into the
numbers. Title II establishes the emissions stand-
ards for vehicles, the reformulated gasoline and
clean vehicle requirements, and the requirements for
inspection and repair of vehicles. The annual costs
of Title II in 2010 are predicted to be almost $12
billion (U.S. EPA, 1999, table 8-3). Of the estimated
$145 billion in annual benefits for that year, about
$139 billion are attributed to the health benefits of
controlling particulate matter emissions (U.S. EPA,
1999, table H-5). Even if all of the remaining $6
billion in benefits could be attributed to reductions
in ozone concentrations due to Title II (and they
cannot be), the total cost of Title II would be twice
its benefits.
But even this comparison is too crude to be of
much help to policy makers, since it does not
identify which components of this complex set of
legislative mandates and regulations are to blame
for the negative net benefits of the Title II program
as a whole. What is needed is an analysis that breaks
out both benefits and costs for the specific compo-
nents of this program (U.S. EPA, Science Advisory
Board, 1999).
All of this discussion takes the numbers in these
two reports at face value. But it should be no surprise
that the numbers themselves are quite controversial.
The most controversial feature of the analysis is the
relationship between particulate matter and prema-
ture mortality used by EPA in calculating benefits
5  This was one of the major criticisms of both the Retrospective and
Prospective Reports by the Council. See the Council letters to the Admin-
istrator U.S. EPA, Science Advisory Board (1997, 1999) available online
at http://www.epa.gov/sab/fisclrpt.htm. See also Lutter and Belzer (2000).6   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(Crandall, 1997; Lutter and Belzer, 2000; Portney,
2000).
EPA’s analysis implies about 10% of all mortal-
ity in the United States is associated with particulate
air pollution, which, at a glance, looks high.
However, the EPA predictions do have some
reputable evidence behind them. They are based on
a long-term cohort epidemiology study that tracked
more than 500,000 subjects from 151 cities over an
eight-year period (Pope et al., 1995); and an earlier,
smaller study from six cities estimated an even
stronger relationship between premature mortality
and particulate matter (Dockery et al., 1993).
More recently, the Health Effects Institute
reanalyzed the data from both studies and confirmed
the results (Krewski et al., 2000). The association
between premature mortality and particulate matter
is also consistent with a number of studies of the
relationship between daily mortality rates and daily
changes in air pollution. For further discussion of
these issues, see U.S. EPA (1997, 1999).
Another point of controversy in these EPA
studies is the value placed on reducing premature
mortality. EPA used a value per life saved of $6.3
million, drawn from an analysis of a set of estimates
based mostly on the wage-risk tradeoffs revealed in
labor markets. The sample mean willingness to pay
for a reduction in risk from the labor market studies
is for a roughly 40-year-old healthy worker with a
substantial remaining life expectancy. But a major
fraction of the people at risk of death due to ele-
vated particular matter is much older, typically 70
and above. The life-years to be saved are much less
for the group experiencing the greatest reduction in
the risk of premature mortality. It can be argued that
the willingness to pay to reduce the risk of death for
people in this group would be less than that of a
typical 40 year old.
Another issue involves the omission of indirect
or general equilibrium effects in the estimate of costs.
EPA’s cost estimate is the sum of annual direct
expenditures on operation and maintenance and the
amortized capital investments in pollution control
equipment. Not included are the indirect costs aris-
ing through general equilibrium effects in labor and
capital markets that are already distorted by income
and other taxes (Parry and Oates, 2000). These indi-
rect costs could increase estimated costs by 25S35%
(U.S. EPA, Science Advisory Board, 1999).
While taking note of the issues raised here as well
as other matters, the panel established by Congress
to review these studies characterized them as
“serious, careful stud[ies] that, in general, employ[ed]
sound methods and data,” and produced conclusions
which were “generally consistent with the weight of
available evidence” (U.S. EPA, Science Advisory
Board, 1997, 1999).
Another way to assess the welfare implications of
the Clean Air Act is to examine the regulatory
impact assessments for specific regulations promul-
gated under the Act. Hahn (2000) examined 136 of
these regulatory impact assessments carried out
between 1981 and mid-1996 from eight different
agencies, including those for 45 rules promulgated
or proposed by EPA under the Clean Air Act. He
put the regulatory impact assessments on a compar-
able footing by standardizing the discount rate (at
5%) and the valuation of reductions in premature
mortality (at $5.6 million per statistical life).
For the Clean Air Act, Hahn reported, in aggre-
gate, the 35 final rules actually promulgated were
estimated to produce net benefits of about $660
billion in present value terms. Almost two-thirds of
this total is due to one regulation responsible for
substantially reducing the lead content of gasoline
in 1985. Only 19 of the 35 rules had significant
positive net benefits when evaluated separately.
Similar results held for the proposed rules. Hahn
argued that regulatory agencies in general are likely
to overstate benefits and understate costs in these
analyses, and consequently the true picture would
be less favorable than his analysis shows.
The New Air Quality Standards 
for Particulate Matter and Ozone
The most significant recent policy choice made
under the Clean Air Act is the revision to the air
quality standards for particulate matter and ozone.
EPA is required to review the scientific evidence
and consider revisions to each standard every five
years. In 1996, EPA proposed a significant tighten-
ing of these standards. In 1997, it released its regu-
latory impact assessment for the proposed standards.
The proposal is interesting for both the legal and
economic issues it raised.
The legal requirement that standards be set so as
to protect human health with an adequate margin of
safety can only be satisfied if the relationship
between the concentration of the pollutant and the
health effect has a threshold. If there is no thresh-
old, reductions in concentrations all the way down
to zero (or at least to the background environmental
level) will increase the degree of protection against
adverse health effects. For ozone and particulate
matter, the scientific consensus is that there is noFreeman Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policy   7
threshold (U.S. EPA, Science Advisory Board,
1995, 1996). So how can EPA comply with the man-
date of the Clean Air Act?
EPA promulgated revised standards for particu-
lates and ozone which were above the zero or
background level in July 1997. Affected groups,
including the American Trucking Associations,
appealed these standards to the U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals. This court stated, “... the only concen-
tration for ozone and PM that is utterly risk free ...
is zero.... For EPA to pick any nonzero level it must
explain the degree of imperfection permitted.” The
court concluded, “EPA ... has failed to state intelli-
gibly how much is too much.” The court also ruled
that since the Clean Air Act provided no clear basis
for deciding how much air pollution to allow, it was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
At the same time, the court rejected the plaintiffs’
claim that the Clean Air Act allows EPA to take
costs into account in setting air quality standards
(U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, American Trucking
Associations vs. Browner, 1999). Both parties ap-
pealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Of course, one intelligible way to state “how
much is too much” is to take costs into account and
to balance costs against benefits either formally or
informally. In fact, the AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies (2000) submitted an Amici
Curiae brief in the case arguing just that.
6 However,
the Supreme Court has now ruled that the Clean Air
Act does preclude consideration of costs in setting
air quality standards and that the limits on EPA’s
discretion in setting standards are no more vague
than in other statutes that have withstood judicial
scrutiny (U.S. Supreme Court, Whitman vs. Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, 2001).
While this decision leaves EPA’s new standards
for particulates and ozone intact, it also leaves EPA
with no guidance about how close to zero to set its
pollution standards in future revisions. The Supreme
Court decision has set up an awkward situation in
which EPA is required by the executive order to
carry out what is, in effect, a benefit-cost analysis of
alternative levels for the standards, but is bound by
law to ignore the cost side of the analysis when
making its decisions.
Despite this anomalous situation, the regulatory
impact assessments done for particulate matter and
ozone are illuminating. EPA reported estimates of
benefits and costs of both partial attainment and full
Table 3. Annual Benefits and Costs of Partial
Attainment of the Proposed Air Quality Stand-
ards by PM2.5 and Ozone (billions of 2000 $/
year)
Benefits Costs Net Benefits
PM2.5 25 to 137 11.3 13.7 to 126
Ozone 0.5 to 2.8   1.4 !0.9 to 1.4  
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997. Regulatory
Import Assessment for Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS and
Proposed Regional Haze Rule.
attainment of the proposed standards. This was be-
cause EPA could not identify control technologies
capable of achieving the proposed standards in all
parts of the country. The full attainment costs were
based on the assumption that additional control
technologies would become available at costs not to
exceed about $10,000 per ton of emissions con-
trolled. EPA argued on the grounds of technological
optimism that full attainment costs were likely over-
stated. However, in my judgment, the full attainment
costs are not credible. So I will discuss only the
results for partial attainment here.
EPA reported “low-end” and “high-end” esti-
mates of costs and benefits, but did not report a best
estimate or expected value. Neither did it incorpor-
ate uncertainties in the cost estimates. The results
for partial attainment are presented in table 3. The
substantial net benefits for the proposed particulate
matter standard come primarily in the form of
reduced risk of premature mortality and, as noted
above, there is controversy over the magnitude of
this relationship.
However, if EPA’s numbers are taken at face
value, there is the additional question of whether an
even stricter standard might be justified on the basis
of marginal benefits versus marginal costs. While
EPA did perform an assessment of the benefits and
costs of partial attainment of a more strict standard
for particulates, it only reported the high-end value
for benefits. The high-end analysis showed positive
marginal net benefits. However, the best estimate of
marginal net benefits is not reported, leaving open
the possibility the findings might be negative.
According to the EPA numbers, the net benefits
of the proposed ozone standard could be positive.
But the high-end estimate of benefits is based on a
recent study reporting an association between ele-
vated ozone levels and premature mortality. This
finding is even more controversial than the particu-
late mortality relationship and has not been observed
6  Signers of the brief included Nobel Laureates Kenneth Arrow, Milton
Friedman, and Robert Solow, along with 39 other well-known economists.8   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
consistently in other studies. If ozone does not cause
premature mortality, then the proposed ozone stand-
ard does not appear to pass a benefit-cost test. Many
analysts believe EPA substantially underestimated
the costs of partial attainment of the ozone standard
(for example, Krupnick, 1997). Thus, even the high-
end positive net benefits are in doubt.
The Clean Water Act
The original version of the Clean Water Act became
law in 1972, and established national goals for water
pollution policy: the attainment of fishable and
swimmable waters by July 1, 1983, and the elimin-
ation of all discharges of pollutants into navigable
waters by 1985. The means selected for achieving
this goal was a system of technology-based standards
to be established by EPA and applied to discharges
from all industrial and municipal (especially sewage
treatment plant) sources. These standards were to
define the maximum quantities of pollutants each
source would be allowed to discharge. The standards
were to be based strictly on technological factors,
such as what kind of pollution abatement equipment
was available, rather than on water quality objec-
tives. Under the Act, regulators did not need to esti-
mate the capacity of bodies of water to assimilate
pollutants, nor did they need to consider the rela-
tionship between individual dischargers and water
quality. The Act called for the same effluent stand-
ards to be applied to all dischargers within classes
and categories of industries, rather than a plant-by-
plant determination of allowable discharges on the
basis of water quality considerations.
Economics played only a minor role in this pro-
cess, in the sense that the requirement to use the
best feasible technology was accompanied by
phrases such as “at reasonable cost.” But the rela-
tionship between benefits and costs played no
explicit role in determining what levels of pollution
abatement would be required under the Act.
Accomplishments of the Clean 
Water Act
Bingham et al. (1998) used a model of pollution dis-
charges and water quality across the United States
to predict how much water quality of our rivers
improved because of the Clean Water Act as of the
mid-1990s, compared with a baseline that assumed
no additional controls on discharges with the
passage of the Act. The improvement in the number
of river miles meeting water quality standards for
various uses is relatively small. The number of river
miles meeting standards for swimming, fishing, and
boating increased by only 6.3%, 4.2%, and 2.8%,
respectively.
In a review of this and other evidence on accomp-
lishments of the Clean Water Act of 1972, I have
said (Freeman, 2000) that average water quality was
not too bad in 1972, and has improved only mod-
estly since then. However, certain local areas that
were quite bad in 1972 have been cleaned up
dramatically. Although the Clean Water Act has
done a good job on “point sources” of pollution,
from factories and sewage treatment plants, it has
done little to address “nonpoint sources” of water
pollution like runoff from urban and agricultural
areas, which seem to be increasing.
Benefits and Costs
At the time of the passage of the original version of
the Clean Water Act in 1972, no assessment of the
benefits and costs of its major provisions existed.
During the next decade, a number of studies of
various categories of benefits were carried out,
especially for water-based recreation. None of these
studies would meet modern standards of benefit-
cost assessment. They did not, for the most part,
model the relationship between reductions in
discharges and improvements in water quality. Nor
did they establish scenarios for what water quality
would have been in the absence of the provisions of
the Act. Nevertheless, in 1982, I reviewed a number
of these studies, synthesized their results, and com-
pared them with the limited information available
on the costs of water pollution control under the Act
(Freeman, 1982). I concluded the total costs of
meeting the 1983 and 1985 targets were very likely
in excess of the benefits.
The Bingham et al. (1998) study described above
also provided estimates of the benefits of the pre-
dicted water quality improvements attributable to
the Clean Water Act. It used estimates of willing-
ness to pay for various levels of improved water
quality from a contingent valuation study by Carson
and Mitchell (1993) to calculate the benefits of
attaining water quality targets for each river. Total
willingness to pay for the U.S. urban population
was about $9.9 billion per year. This figure counts
only benefits of in-stream uses and the pleasure
received from the control of conventional pollutants.
It does not include benefits for improvements in
water quality in lakes, ponds, estuaries, and marine
waters, benefits from the control of toxic discharges,Freeman Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policy   9
or benefits associated with diversionary uses of
water such as municipal water supply.
However, EPA estimates the annual costs of
water pollution control in 1990 were about $59.7 bil-
lion per year (U.S. EPA, 1990). This is not directly
comparable to the estimate of willingness to pay,
since the years are different and the willingness to
pay covers only some of the benefits of cleaner
water. However, the rough magnitude of these esti-
mates tends to support the conclusion that the Clean
Water Act does not appear to have achieved benefits
commensurate with its costs.
The assessments of specific regulations promul-
gated under the Clean Water Act are consistent with
this conclusion. Hahn’s (2000) study of the
regulatory impact assessments carried out between
1981 and 1996 shows that for the eight final rules
analyzed, aggregate benefits were about 5% of
aggregate costs. The same conclusion held for the
four proposed rules analyzed. Earlier, Hahn (1996,
p. 215) had reported that only one of the rules
analyzed between 1990 and mid-1995 had positive
net benefits.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act, Toxic Substances 
Control Act, and “Unreasonable Risk”
In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to allow pesticides
to be registered for use so long as EPA determined
they would not “cause unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment, ... taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and bene-
fits ... [of use].” The second phrase, which is part of
the definition of “unreasonable adverse effects,” is
clearly a call to balance benefits against costs in
making decisions.
In 1976, Congress enacted the Toxic Substances
Control Act which included authorization to regulate
the production and use of existing and new chem-
icals if EPA finds they pose an “unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment.” Because of
its legislative history and the earlier language in the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act has also
generally been interpreted as allowing a balancing
of benefits and costs (Shapiro, 1990; Augustyniak,
1997).
The evidence on costs and benefits of the rules
promulgated under these two acts is somewhat
limited, but there are two main pieces of evidence.
The first comes from Hahn’s (2000) study of rules
proposed or promulgated between 1981 and mid-
1996. There were only six major rules promulgated
during this time period under these acts. Their total
present value of costs of almost $24 billion yielded
only a little more than $0.3 billion in identified and
monetized benefits. Hahn (2000, p. 44) reported that
in most cases EPA either identified benefits without
quantifying them or did not identify any benefits.
The second piece of evidence is an analysis of
EPA decision making under these two acts carried
out by Van Houtven and Cropper (1996). This study
looked at 245 decisions made between 1975 and
1989 about whether an existing pesticide could be
reregistered for use. These decisions involved 19
active ingredients which are known or suspected car-
cinogens. The authors estimated a model to predict
the probability that a specific use of an ingredient
would be banned. Explanatory variables included
expected numbers of cancer cases avoided for food
consumers, those who apply the pesticide, and those
who mix or load it, and the estimated costs of the
ban.
Van Houtven and Cropper found that the coef-
ficients on cancer cases avoided for those who
apply the pesticide and costs were both significant
and of the expected sign, indicating EPA was
considering both costs and benefits in its decisions.
However, the average cost per cancer case avoided
by banning uses was more than $70 million. Even if
all pesticide-induced cancers were fatal, this cost is
an order of magnitude larger than the value of sta-
tistical life typically used in analyses of benefits of
regulation. Thus, if a benefit-cost analysis of the
whole package of decisions was done with a reason-
able value of statistical life (say $3S6 million), the
program would fail unless other categories of bene-
fits were quite large. However, it remains possible
that certain individual decisions could pass a benefit-
cost test.
Van Houtven and Cropper also conducted a
similar analysis of EPA decisions under the Toxic
Substances Control Act regarding banning the use
of asbestos in a number of products. Their analysis
showed an even higher cost per cancer case avoided,
suggesting costs exceeded benefits here as well.
However, these studies give an incomplete
picture of the impacts of these two laws. These
laws, with their requirements for prior approval of
new chemicals and pesticides, no doubt had a
preventive effect that went beyond the specific
approvals or denials of applications for uses. It is
likely some manufacturers chose not to develop
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on the expectation their applications would be
denied. To the extent that those potential chemicals
would have had social costs exceeding social
benefits, the laws were economic successes.
7 But it
is also possible these laws discouraged the devel-
opment of some chemicals that would have been
socially beneficial.
Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act was first enacted in
1974. It directed EPA to establish safe standards for
drinking water supplied by public water systems
above a certain small size. These standards take the
form of maximum allowable concentrations for
chemical and microbial contaminants. In the first 10
years after the passage of the Act, EPA promulgated
only one maximum allowable concentration. Con-
gress responded in 1986 by amending the Act to
include a listing of 83 contaminants and the require-
ment that maximum allowable concentrations be
established for these contaminants within three
years. While EPA was not able to meet the three-
year deadline, the task is now essentially complete.
For these water quality standards, are the benefits
in the forms of improved human health and reduced
risk of disease commensurate with costs of meeting
these standards? EPA was not required by law to
address this question, and I know of no comprehen-
sive assessment of this question. However, some
revealing partial evidence is available.
A study of the results of the Safe Drinking Water
Act done for EPA by Raucher et al. (1993) sheds
some light on the subject. Their analysis was
limited to contaminants posing a risk of cancer.
They first reported costs and cancer deaths avoided
for the program as a whole. The result is a cost per
cancer death avoided of about $4.7 million. This
value compares favorably with the value of statis-
tical life used by EPA in several recent assessments
($6.3 million), suggesting the benefits of the max-
imum allowable concentrations for carcinogens
exceed the costs.
Raucher et al. then reported costs and deaths
avoided for the 10 most cost-effective contaminants
(primarily volatile organic compounds). The cost
per death avoided for these contaminants was an
even more favorable $2.9 million, well below
EPA’s value of statistical life. However, from these
data it is possible to estimate the cost per life saved
associated with the maximum allowable concentra-
tions for the remaining carcinogens (more than 60
substances). This amount is a very high $127 million
per death avoided, indicating the costs for these
maximum allowable concentrations substantially
exceeded their benefits. However, it is important to
note this analysis ignores any benefits associated
with reducing health effects other than cancer for
these substances, and also ignores the benefits and
costs of reducing exposures to those substances
which do not cause cancer.
Hahn’s (2000) analysis of regulatory impact
assessments carried out between 1981 and 1996
includes five final rules and three proposed rules
under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Both the
proposed and final rules taken as a group show
aggregate benefits exceeding costs. But almost all
of the benefits of the final rules are attributable to
only one rule—regarding lead in drinking water
(see also Levin, 1997). Thus it is again possible to
infer the benefits are less than the costs for the other
rules.
Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act in
1996 directed EPA to undertake an economic analy-
sis of future proposed maximum allowable concen-
trations to determine if the benefits justify the costs
and to adjust the maximum allowable concentrations
in light of this analysis as necessary. Thus, the Safe
Drinking Water Act joined the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic
Substances Control Act as the only environmental
laws explicitly calling for consideration of benefits
and costs. EPA has now finalized a rule for a maxi-
mum allowable concentration for radon. As Hahn
and Burnett (2001) point out, EPA’s own data show
a benefit-cost ratio of only about 0.3 for this rule.
The authors also identify deficiencies in EPA’s
analysis that likely result in an overestimate of the
benefits of the rule.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, commonly known
as Superfund, was enacted in 1980 to provide for
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites already in
existence. Thanks to the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, more stringent
cleanup requirements are in place today. The primary
focus of the cleanup requirements is the protection
of human health. EPA investigates contaminated
sites, estimates risks to health, and for those sites
deemed to pose a risk to health, establishes a remed-
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iation plan based on criteria set forth in the Act.
Remediation plans are not subjected to a benefit-
cost analysis.
Hamilton and Viscusi (1999a,b) have carried out
a comprehensive analysis of the risks, costs, and
cost-effectiveness of the remediation plans for a
selected sample of 150 Superfund sites in 1991S92.
The best single indicator of the relationship between
the benefits and costs of remediation at these sites
is Hamilton and Viscusi’s estimates of the cost per
cancer case avoided by the selected remediation
plan. They determined, for the 145 sites for which
data are available, the mean cost is about $3.5
million per case avoided. Making the assumption all
cancers are fatal, this implies that a benefit-cost
analysis using a value of anything above $3.5 mil-
lion per death avoided would suggest the program
was economically justified.
However, this result occurs because the aggregate
data are dominated by a relatively small number of
sites with low costs per cancer case avoided. About
70% of the sites have estimated costs per case
avoided which are greater than about $112 million,
implying that unless there are significant benefits in
such categories as avoiding noncancer health effects
and ecological and natural resource effects, the
majority of the remediation plans are not econom-
ically justified, at least not at their present scope
and degree of cleanup.
Conclusions
We have looked at the available evidence concerning
the benefits and costs of six of the major environ-
mental laws enacted or substantially amended since
Earth Day I: the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean
Water Act (CWA), the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA), and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (Superfund). It is not a particularly useful exer-
cise to attempt to aggregate all of the benefit and
cost data reviewed here to arrive at a total net
benefit estimate, to try to see whether environ-
mental regulation as a whole has been positive or
negative.
There have been some winners and some losers.
The important question is: What changes can we
make to the current set of policies to improve the
net benefits?
Among the winners in terms of net economic
benefits are:
P the removal of lead from gasoline under the
CAA;
P reducing the concentration of lead in drinking
water under SDWA;
P controlling particulate matter air pollution under
the CAA;
P the setting of maximum allowable concentrations
for some violate organic compounds under the
SDWA;
P the cleanup of those hazardous waste sites with
the lowest cost per cancer case avoided under
Superfund; and
P the control of emissions of chlorofluorocarbons
in accordance with terms of the Montreal Proto-
col, although as noted above, this is less certain
because of the likely overestimation of the bene-
fits.
These winners share the common characteristics
of involving threats to human health, especially
mortality, and widespread exposures of people.
Even in the case of lead, which is primarily known
for its toxic effect on nervous systems, a major por-
tion of the monetizable benefits of controlling lead
comes from the reduction in hypertension and the
associated risk of cardiovascular disease in adults.
The losers in terms of net economic benefits
include:
P mobile source air pollution control;
P much of the control of discharges into the nation’s
waterways under the CWA, although the nega-
tive net economic benefits in aggregate undoubt-
edly obscure positive net benefits in controlling
discharges into particular lakes and rivers; and
P many of the regulations, standards, and cleanup
decisions taken under TSCA, FIFRA, and SDWA,
and Superfund.
Before turning to the policy implications of these
findings, we need to identify some qualifications and
caveats. All benefit-cost analyses have uncertainties
and omissions. For example, there may be important
effects of pollutants on human health that have so
far escaped detection. If this is the case, present
estimates of the health benefits of environmental
cleanup are biased downward.
Also, omitted benefits could include the protection
of ecological systems and their services, preservation
of biodiversity, and what are called “nonuse” or
“existence” values, meaning the value people place
on a cleaner environment as a goal in itself. Many12   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
natural scientists contend ecosystem and biodiver-
sity values are not given sufficient attention by
economists (e.g., Daily, 1997). But there is very
limited evidence concerning the effects of present-
day environmental policy decisions on ecological
systems and biodiversity, and these values were not
a principal focus of most of the environmental laws
considered here.
On the cost side, it is sometimes argued that costs
are systematically overestimated because of the in-
ability to anticipate the technological improvements
in pollution control, process change, and input
substitution stimulated by the requirements of the
regulations themselves (e.g., Porter, 1991; Porter
and van der Linde, 1995). On the other hand, Hahn
(1996) asserts that agencies have systematic incen-
tives to underestimate costs (and to overestimate
benefits as well). Harrington, Morgenstern, and
Nelson (2000) found a limited number of cases of
underestimation of costs, but for half of the rules
they studied, they found overestimation to be the
case. However, at least the most extreme versions of
technological optimism regarding pollution control
are not supported by the evidence (Palmer, Oates,
and Portney, 1995; Jaffe et al., 1995).
The first and perhaps most important policy impli-
cation of this analysis is to emphasize that virtually
all environmental policies and programs could be
improved by making them more cost-effective, i.e.,
by finding ways to reduce the costs of attaining
given targets. One method to improve cost effec-
tiveness is to replace command-and-control policy
instruments with market-based incentives such as
tradeable emissions permits, emission taxes, and
deposit-refund systems. The potential for effluent
taxes, fuel taxes, and tradeable permits to improve
cost-effectiveness is especially relevant for water
and mobile source air pollution control. For further
discussion of the present potential of market-based
environmental tools, see Stavins (2000), Portney
(2000), and Freeman (2000).
The cost-effectiveness of regulatory programs can
also be improved by scaling back or eliminating spe-
cific regulations and standards where the costs per
unit of measurable performance (for example, cost
per cancer case avoided) are high, and by adopting
more strict standards where costs per unit of perfor-
mance are low (see, e.g., Hahn, 1996, 2000; Hamil-
ton and Viscusi, 1999b; and Raucher et al., 1993).
Another way to improve the economic perfor-
mance of environmental policy is to give more
weight to the comparison of benefits and costs,
especially at the margin, in making environmental
choices. As we have seen, some laws preclude
balancing of costs and benefits in setting standards.
But even where balancing is allowed or required—
as in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act,
and the Safe Drinking Water Act—the economic
performance of environmental regulation has been
spotty at best. Standards and regulations have been
adopted even when realistic assessments show the
benefits are less than the costs.
At a minimum, this result should make one
skeptical of the argument that environmental regula-
tory agencies have been “captured” by polluting
interests. Indeed, Hahn (1996) asserts the substan-
tial number of cases where environmental costs
exceed benefits is evidence that regulatory agencies
have been successful in increasing their power and
expanding their budgets and roles in the American
economy.
However, there are alternative explanations for
what appears to be overregulation. For instance,
there may be benefits of regulation that economics
has not been able to identify and quantify. It is pos-
sible these benefits are recognized by environmental
decision makers and by the voters who apparently
support these policies. Another way to put this is to
argue that the American people, by their willingness
to continue their support of environmental programs
whose measurable benefits are shown to be less
than costs, are revealing a willingness to pay more
for these environmental improvements than the
amount captured by conventional measures of bene-
fits.
Another possibility is that voters believe, at least
for the policies they support, the costs are borne by
others, the “black hat polluters.” If this is the case,
then the challenge for policy makers is to describe
the opportunity costs of excess regulation to those
who actually bear them, and commit themselves to
maintaining or improving standards in those areas
where benefits demonstrably exceed costs. A public
perception that the benefits of environmental protec-
tion can be realized while costs are borne by others
will sooner or later collide with the reality that
for the more intractable of our environmental prob-
lems—for example, the pollution and congestion
externalities associated with private automobile
transportation—we all will have to pay for any ben-
efits we expect to receive.
It is difficult to know whether the American pub-
lic would support a set of environmental policies
that is economically rational by conventional mea-
sures. The challenge for policy makers may be toFreeman Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policy   13
build credibility for cost-benefit analysis by making
a public commitment to maintaining or improving
environmental standards in those areas where bene-
fits demonstrably exceed costs. By offering vocal
support for environmental policies that do provide
net benefits, and perhaps giving the benefit of the
doubt to cases where the measurable net benefits are
close to zero, policy makers may be able to build
credibility when they need to argue that certain
regulations have opportunity costs in excess of their
benefits.
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